Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 113 No. 3 2014
Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
Abstract
We use the deaths of directors and chief executive officers as a natural experiment to generate exogenous variation in the time and resources available to independent directors at interlocked firms. The loss of such key co-employees is an attention shock because it increases the board committee workload only for some interlocked directors—the ‘treatment group’. There is a negative stock market reaction to attention shocks only for treated director-interlocked firms. Interlocking directors׳ busyness, the importance of their board roles, and their degree of independence magnify the treatment effect. Overall, directors׳ busyness is detrimental to board monitoring quality and shareholder value.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.005
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 404-426
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref