Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 85 No. 1 2007
Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior
Abstract
Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.003
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 205-233
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref