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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 18 No. 1 1987

The wealth effects of company initiated management changes

Eugene P. H. Furtado1,2,3; Michael S. Rozeff1,3,4

1 University of Iowa · 2 University of San Diego · 3 Kansas State University · 4 University at Buffalo, State University of New York

open access

Abstract

The essence of corporate control includes the hiring and firing of key managers. We examine changes in equity values when the Board of Directors appoints and dismisses top-level managers. The evidence suggests that management changes signal shifts in company policy and raise shareholder wealth, internal promotions confirm the soundness of investment by large companies in firm-specific human capital while external appointments do not, promotions occur more often than external appointments but decline in importance as firm size decreases, and dismissal is not a favored means to handle managerial underperformance but is associated with stock price increases when used.

DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(87)90065-1
Volume
18
Issue
1
Pages
147-160
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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