Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 128 No. 1 2018
Do universal banks finance riskier but more productive firms?
Abstract
Using variation in bank scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US, we show that the deregulation of universal banks allowed them to finance firms with 14% higher volatility. This increase in risk is compensated by lasting improvements in firms’ total factor productivity of 3%. Using bank scope-expanding mergers to identify shocks to universal banks’ private information about borrower firms, we provide evidence that informational economies of scope across loans and non-loan products account for the firm-level real effects of universal banking.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.011
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 66-85
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib