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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 103 No. 1 2012

Optimal clearing arrangements for financial trades

Thorsten Koeppl1; Cyril Monnet2; Ted Temzelides3

1 Queen's University · 2 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia · 3 Rice University

Abstract

Clearinghouses support financial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing liquidity through short-term credit that participants clear periodically. We study efficient clearing arrangements for exchanges, where traders must clear with a clearinghouse, and for over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where traders can clear bilaterally. When clearing is costly, it can be efficient to subsidize OTC clearing by charging a higher clearing price for transactions conducted on exchanges. The clearinghouse then operates across both markets. Since clearinghouses offer credit, intertemporal incentives are needed to ensure settlement. When liquidity costs increase, concerns about default lead to a tightening of liquidity provision.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.008
Volume
103
Issue
1
Pages
189-203
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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