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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 128 No. 3 2018

Managerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown

Adam C. Kolasinski1; Nan Yang2

1 Texas A&M University · 2 Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract

Prominent policy makers assert that managerial short-termism was at the root of the subprime crisis of 2007–2009. Prior scholarly research, however, largely rejects this assertion. Using a more comprehensive measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives for short-termism, we uncover evidence that short-termism indeed played a role. Firms whose CEOs were contractually allowed to sell or exercise more of their stock and options holdings sooner had more subprime exposure, a higher probability of financial distress, and lower risk-adjusted stock returns during the crisis, as well as higher fines and settlements for subprime-related fraud.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.03.010
Volume
128
Issue
3
Pages
466-485
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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