Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 111 No. 1 2014
Investment busts, reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd
Abstract
We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of agents' quality, many agents abandon their projects strategically even if they are unaffected by the shock. Such “blending in with the crowd” effect creates an additional incentive to delay abandonment ahead of the shock, leading to accumulation of “living dead” projects, which further amplifies the shock. The potential for moderate public common shocks often improves agents' values.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.09.002
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 137-157
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref