Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 139 No. 1 2021
Creditor control rights and resource allocation within firms
Abstract
We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring outcomes at firms violating debt covenants. Using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau, we find that covenant violations are followed by reductions in employment, investment, and more frequent establishment closures among violating firms’ noncore business lines and less productive establishments. These changes are concentrated among establishments at which manager-shareholder agency costs are pronounced and when key lenders have industry experience. Our findings suggest that enhanced creditor control reduces managerial agency costs and encourages a more efficient allocation of resources within the boundaries of firms in technical default.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.006
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 186-208
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref