← Search

Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 101 No. 2 2011

Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

Eliezer M. Fich1; Jie Cai1; Anh Tran2

1 Drexel University · 2 City, University of London

Abstract

Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999–2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.010
Volume
101
Issue
2
Pages
413-430
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite