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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 117 No. 2 2015

Signal or noise? Uncertainty and learning about whether other traders are informed

Snehal Banerjee1; Brett Green2

1 Northwestern University · 2 University of California, Berkeley

Abstract

We develop a model where some investors are uncertain whether others are trading on informative signals or noise. Uncertainty about others leads to a nonlinear price that reacts asymmetrically to news. We incorporate this uncertainty into a dynamic setting where traders gradually learn about others and show that it generates empirically relevant return dynamics: expected returns are stochastic but predictable, and volatility exhibits clustering and the “leverage” effect. The model nests both the rational expectations (RE) and differences of opinions (DO) approaches and highlights a link between disagreement about fundamentals and uncertainty about other traders.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.05.003
Volume
117
Issue
2
Pages
398-423
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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