← Search

Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 127 No. 1 2018

Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Stephen G. Dimmock1; William Christopher Gerken2; Zoran Ivković3; Scott J. Weisbenner4

1 Nanyang Technological University · 2 University of Kentucky · 3 Michigan State University · 4 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

open access

Abstract

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.001
Volume
127
Issue
1
Pages
113-135
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite