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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 126 No. 1 2017

The effects of institutional investor objectives on firm valuation and governance

Paul Borochin1; Jie Yang2,3

1 University of Connecticut · 2 Federal Reserve Board of Governors · 3 Federal Reserve

open access

Abstract

We find that ownership by different types of institutional investors has varying implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation, in both direction and magnitude, relative to fundamentals. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. Similarly, dedicated investors are associated with better future governance characteristics, while transient investors are not. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.013
Volume
126
Issue
1
Pages
171-199
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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