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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 106 No. 2 2012

The sources of value destruction in acquisitions by entrenched managers

Jarrad Harford1; Mark Humphery-Jenner; Ronan Powell2

1 University of Washington · 2 UNSW Sydney

open access

Abstract

Prior work has established that entrenched managers make value-decreasing acquisitions. In this study, we determine how they destroy that value. Overall, we find that value destruction by entrenched managers comes from a combination of factors. First, they disproportionately avoid private targets, which have been shown to be generally associated with value creation. Second, when they do buy private targets or public targets with blockholders, they tend not to use all-equity offers, which has the effect of avoiding the transfer of a valuable blockholder to the bidder. We further test whether entrenched managers simply overpay for good targets or choose targets with lower synergies. We find that while they overpay, they also choose low synergy targets in the first place, as shown by combined announcement returns and post-merger operating performance.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.016
Volume
106
Issue
2
Pages
247-261
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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