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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 125 No. 1 2017

Board reforms and firm value: Worldwide evidence

Larry Fauver1; Mingyi Hung2; Xi Li2; Alvaro G. Taboada3

1 University of Tennessee at Knoxville · 2 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · 3 Mississippi State University

Abstract

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that board reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and chief executive officer positions, drive the valuation increases. In addition, while comply-or-explain reforms result in a greater increase in firm value than rule-based reforms, the effects of reforms are similar across civil law and common law countries. Further investigation shows that the subsequent change in board independence plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness of the reforms.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.010
Volume
125
Issue
1
Pages
120-142
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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