Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 15 No. 1-2 1986
Why new issues are underpriced
Abstract
This paper presents a model for the underpricing of initial public offerings. The argument depends upon the existence of a group of investors whose information is superior to that of the firm as well as that of all other investors. If the new shares are priced at their expected value, these priveleged investors crowd out the others when good issues are offered and they withdraw from the market when bad issues are offered. The offering firm must price the shares at a discount in order to guarantee that the uninformed investors purchase the issue.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(86)90054-1
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 187-212
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref