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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 74 No. 2 2004

Managerial succession and firm performance

Mark R. Huson1; Paul H. Malatesta2; Robert Parrino3

1 University of Alberta · 2 University of Washington · 3 The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract

We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.002
Volume
74
Issue
2
Pages
237-275
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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