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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 152 2024

Why did shareholder liability disappear?

David A. Bogle; Gareth Campbell; Christopher Coyle; John D. Turner

Queen's University Belfast

open access

Abstract

Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103761
Volume
152
Pages
103761
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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