Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 69 No. 1 2003
Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies
Abstract
We analyze whether board structure and director independence in closed-end investment companies are related to shareholder interests in ways that are consistent with boards being effective monitors. We report that funds with relatively low expense ratios, one measure of board effectiveness, have smaller boards, a higher proportion of board members who are legally considered independent, relatively low director compensation, and charter provisions that specify remedial action if discounts become large. Evidence from our analysis of major fund restructuring decisions, including share repurchases, open-ending proposals and right offerings, is largely consistent with the expense ratio analysis. Overall, board characteristics that we identify with effective board independence are associated with lower expense ratios and value-enhancing restructurings.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00110-7
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 111-152
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref