← Search

Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 85 No. 2 2007

The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions

Hamid Mehran1; René M. Stulz2

1 Federal Reserve Bank of New York · 2 The Ohio State University

Abstract

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. This paper examines the growing empirical literature on the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest but are overall more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.001
Volume
85
Issue
2
Pages
267-296
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite