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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 172 2025

Maximal extractable value and allocative inefficiencies in public blockchains

Agostino Capponi1; Ruizhe Jia2; Kanye Ye Wang3

1 Columbia University · 2 Stanford University · 3 University of Macau

Abstract

The blockchain settlement layer facilitates systematic frontrunning, resulting in inefficient block-space allocation. Private transaction pools can reduce these inefficiencies and enhance welfare. However, full adoption is limited by misaligned incentives between users and validators. Validators are reluctant to forgo rents they earn from frontrunning – referred to as maximal extractable value – leading to a partial adoption equilibrium in which frontrunning persists. Our empirical analysis of Ethereum’s Flashbots private pool supports these findings: validators earn higher revenues, users facing greater frontrunning risk are more likely to use the private pool, and attackers’ cost-to-revenue ratios in private pools converge to one.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104132
Volume
172
Pages
104132
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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