Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 33 No. 3 1993
Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
Abstract
This paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(93)90011-y
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 341-368
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref