Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 60 No. 1 2001
The option to withdraw IPOs during the premarket: empirical analysis
Abstract
American IPOs are priced after a process of bookbuilding, during which issuers can withdraw at any time. We hypothesize that the option to withdraw reduces underpricing by strengthening the issuers’ bargaining power with respect to investors. Empirical analysis reveals that underpricing is lower when investor perception of an IPO's likelihood of withdrawal is higher. Withdrawing issuers are neither smaller nor less profitable than issuers completing their IPOs, and engage underwriters that are as reputable as those managing completed offerings. Withdrawal is correlated with leverage, intended use of proceeds, expected issue size, venture backing, revenues, NASDAQ returns, and IPO activity.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00040-x
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 73-102
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref