Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 109 No. 3 2013
Undisclosed orders and optimal submission strategies in a limit order market
Abstract
Reserve orders enable traders to hide a portion of their orders and now appear in most electronic limit order markets. This paper outlines a theory to determine an optimal submission strategy in a limit order book, in which traders choose among limit, market, and reserve orders and simultaneously set price, quantity, and exposure. We show that reserve orders help traders compete for the provision of liquidity and reduce the friction generated by exposure costs. Therefore, total gains from trade increase. Large traders always benefit from reserve orders, whereas small traders benefit only when the tick size is large.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.002
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 797-812
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref