Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 5 No. 3 1996
Banking and Deposit Insurance as a Risk Transfer Mechanism
Abstract
This paper models an economy in which risk-averse savers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs make investment decisions. Aggregate investment in high-yielding risky projects is maximized when risk-neutral agents bear all nondiversifiable risks. A role of banks is to assume nondiversifiable risks by pledging their capital in addition to diversifying risks. Banks, however, do not completely eliminate risks when monitoring by depositors is imperfect. Government deposit insurance that uses tax revenue to repay depositors transfers remaining risks to entrepreneurs. Deposit insurance can improve welfare because imperfect monitoring by the government largely results in income transfer among risk-neutral agents rather than lower production.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G21, G28.
- DOI
- 10.1006/jfin.1996.0016
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 284-304
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref