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Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 14 No. 3 2005

Hold-up, stakeholders and takeover threats

Gilles Chemla1,2

1 Centre d’études et de Recherches sur l’espace Germanophone · 2 Imperial College London

open access

Abstract

We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long-term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders' bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners' incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value created by a takeover. This can prevent some value-enhancing takeovers. We examine extensions to the disciplinary role of takeovers, takeover defense mechanisms, and trade credit, and discuss empirical predictions.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfi.2004.08.004
Volume
14
Issue
3
Pages
376-397
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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