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Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 9 No. 4 2000

Asymmetric Information and News Disclosure Rules

Matthew Spiegel1; Avanidhar Subrahmanyam2

1 Yale University · 2 University of California, Los Angeles

Abstract

When the imminence of news announcements is not public knowledge, many traders will lack information on both the mean and variance of private information. Our analysis of such a setting in both single and multisecurity contexts implies that disclosure of impending information events by firms can bound variance uncertainty and thereby improve investor welfare by mitigating the market breakdown problem. We also find that the equilibrium pricing functions are nonlinear; specifically, convex for small trades and concave for larger ones. In addition, we predict that large transactions will be followed by large levels of volatility. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 026, 522.

DOI
10.1006/jfin.2000.0294
Volume
9
Issue
4
Pages
363-403
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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