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Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 44 2020

Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking

Natalya Martynova1; Lev Ratnovski2,3; Razvan Vlahu4

1 Deutsche Bundesbank · 2 International Monetary Fund · 3 European Central Bank · 4 De Nederlandsche Bank

Abstract

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfi.2019.03.006
Volume
44
Pages
100821
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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