Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 18 No. 2 2009
Regulating securities analysts
Abstract
We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfi.2008.07.001
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-283
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref