Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 2 No. 4 1992
Optimal capital structure for a hierarchical firm
Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal financial structure for a firm in which the top manager must provide incentives to a subordinate in addition to exerting directly productive efforts. Optimal capital structure is shown to involve a moderate level of debt with a substantial penalty for default, and passive shareholders. In a two- or three-layer hierarchy, optimal leverage is shown to decrease as either the number of hierarchical levels or the importance of agents further down the hierarchy increases. This and other implications of the model square well with existing evidence and suggest new directions for empirical work.
- DOI
- 10.1016/1042-9573(92)90010-b
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 376-400
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref