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Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 15 No. 4 2006

The disciplinary role of debt and equity contracts: Theory and tests

Yaniv Grinstein

Cornell University

Abstract

We study how equity and debt contracts commit investors to discipline managers. Our model shows that the optimal allocation of debt, equity, and control rights depends on which disciplinary action is more efficient. When the efficient action is managerial replacement, then control rights should be allocated to equity holders, and capital structure should consist of equity and long-term debt. When the efficient action is liquidation, then control rights can be allocated to the manager, and capital structure should consist of equity and short-term debt. We find empirical support to the model's predictions in a sample of leveraged buyout transactions.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfi.2006.02.001
Volume
15
Issue
4
Pages
419-443
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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