Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 3 No. 3 1994
Money and Credit with Asymmetric Information
Abstract
This paper studies the use of cash and credit for making transactions when there is asymmetric information in credit markets. For relatively low inflation rates, equilibria are of the pooling variety and low-credit-risk consumers signal their riskiness to lenders only indirectly by establishing a good track record in credit markets. For higher inflation rates there may exist a separating equilibrium in which low-credit-risk consumers directly signal their type to lenders by specializing in cash early in life and specializing in credit later in life. The greater the degree of adverse selection in credit markets, the wider the range of inflation rates for which a separating equilibrium exists. Credit usage is increasing in the inflation rate, but greater adverse selection may increase or decrease credit usage depending on the parameterization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E44.
- DOI
- 10.1006/jfin.1994.1005
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 213-244
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref