Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 1 No. 3 1991
Agency costs among savings and loans
Abstract
When the managers of a firm are not its owners, agency problems result if managers take actions that maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. This paper investigates the existence of agency problems in mutual savings and loans. Using a more general approach than in previous studies, I show that mutual S&Ls were operating with an inefficient output mix while stock S&Ls were not, suggesting an agency problem among mutual S&Ls. The results cast doubt on a common argument that mutuals convert to stock S&Ls to capture economies of scale.
- DOI
- 10.1016/1042-9573(91)90010-w
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 257-278
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib