Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 4 No. 4 1995
If History Could Be Rerun: The Provision and Pricing of Deposit Insurance in 1933
Abstract
This paper examines cross-subsidy, moral hazard, and bank liability issues related to the provision of federal deposit insurance by "rerunning" its implementation, i.e., determining fair premium values, over the period 1927-1932. The pre-1933 period was characterized by historically high asset-price volatility, a large number of bank failures, and a weak federal safety net. In this economic context, we find a high degree of self-insurance on the part of the banks in our sample, both in terms of higher overall capital levels and a strong correlation between capital levels and asset volatility. Potentially large, regional cross-subsidies among banks were also found. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G21.
- DOI
- 10.1006/jfin.1995.1016
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 396-413
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref