← Search

Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 47 2021

Management insulation and bank failures

Daniel Ferreira1,2; David Kershaw3,2; Tom Kirchmaier4,2; Edmund Schuster2

1 Centre for Economic Policy Research · 2 London School of Economics and Political Science · 3 European Corporate Governance Institute · 4 Copenhagen Business School

open access

Abstract

How does management insulation from shareholder pressure influence banks’ resilience to crises? To address this question, we develop a measure of management insulation based on legal provisions. Unlike the existing alternatives, our measure considers the interactions between different provisions. We use this measure to study the relationship between management insulation and bank failure during the 2007–09 financial crisis. We find that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 were less likely to be both bailed out in 2008/09 and targeted by activist shareholders. By contrast, alternative measures of management insulation fail to predict both bailouts and shareholder activism.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfi.2021.100909
Volume
47
Pages
100909
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite