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Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 64 2023

Investor information and bank instability during the European debt crisis

Silvia Iorgova1; Chase P. Ross2,3

1 International Monetary Fund · 2 Federal Reserve · 3 Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Abstract

Outside of financial crises, investors have little incentive to produce private information on banks’ short-term liabilities held as information-insensitive safe assets. The same does not hold during crises. We compare the information effects of different policy interventions. We measure information production using credit default swap spreads during the Global Financial Crisis and the European debt crisis. We study abnormal information production around major events and find that capital injections reduced abnormal information production while early European stress tests increased it. High levels of information production predict bank balance sheet contraction and higher government expenditures to support financial institutions.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101100
Volume
64
Pages
101100
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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