Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 26 2016
Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks?
Abstract
This paper asks whether a single resolution authority for multinational banks is desirable. Such an authority was recently established within the European Monetary Union, where the resolution power for large banks was transferred to a Single Resolution Board. To address this issue, we consider the risk incentives of a multinational bank in the presence of different resolution frameworks and determine the welfare-efficient structure which prevents banks from excessive risk-taking. We argue that a single resolution authority is not always welfare-efficient, because it is the heterogeneity of bank resolution power which induces multinational banks to behave prudently. In severe solvency crises, the multinational authority should have the resolution power, whereas in less severe crises national resolution authorities are more efficient in avoiding excessive risk-taking on the part of multinational banks.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfs.2016.07.015
- Volume
- 26
- Pages
- 159-174
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref