Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 45 2019
Bailing in Banks: costs and benefits
Abstract
We investigate the effectiveness of bail-in mechanisms in mitigating systemic risk and welfare costs to society during resolution processes. To perform this study, we define a network model of mutually exposed banks and use it to simulate the effects of shocks to these banks using granular data of the Brazilian banking system, its interbank exposures and credit register operations. In the simulations, we compare the outcomes of these initial shocks after resolution processes with and without bail-ins. The simulations show that by avoiding the liquidation of banks and the resulting interruption in their credit provision, bail-ins would be effective in preventing the amplification of losses imposed on the real sector. Analyzing the effects that the liquidation of Brazilian Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) would cause to credit provision to economic sectors, we find bailing in these banks would produce a relevant decrease in credit crunches. However, in our sample, only a few banks could benefit from bail-ins due to insufficiency of bail-inable instruments.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfs.2019.100705
- Volume
- 45
- Pages
- 100705
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref