Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 3 No. 3 2007
Who survives? A cross-country comparison
Abstract
How capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance vary across countries has been the focus of recent studies, but how resources are reallocated in response to poor performance has not received as much attention. This paper argues that the market for corporate control and the formal bankruptcy/liquidation processes of a country are two key mechanisms through which corporate assets are reallocated. Ideally, an economy would only allow the best users of economic resources to retain the right to use those assets and any sub-optimal use would result in either a take-over by a more proficient owner or an asset sale. We present evidence that equity market delistings occur more frequently in countries with strong shareholder rights. Furthermore, both strong creditor and shareholder rights increase the use of bankruptcy, relative to acquisitions, as a mechanism to resolve financial distress. We also present some evidence that these mechanisms are not as effective in Japan.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfs.2007.06.004
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 261-278
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref