Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 48 No. 2 2013
State Antitakeover Laws and Voluntary Disclosure
Abstract
We test the relationship between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure in a setting of antitakeover laws in a firm’s state of incorporation. After correcting for the endogeneity of firms’ incorporation choices, we find that firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover laws have higher levels of voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity. Further tests do not support shareholder demands being the driving force for this association. Our findings are consistent with takeover protection and poor disclosure serving as substitute mechanisms for deterring takeovers. Therefore, as antitakeover statutes mitigate takeover threats, they enhance managers’ incentives to disclose more in order to realize capital market benefits.
- DOI
- 10.1017/s0022109013000124
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 637-668
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex