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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 53 No. 5 2018

Hedge Fund Boards and the Market for Independent Directors

Christopher P. Clifford; Jesse A. Ellis; William Christopher Gerken

Abstract

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109018000352
Volume
53
Issue
5
Pages
2067-2101
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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