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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 56 No. 6 2021

Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries

Marco Macchiavelli; Luke Pettit

Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Abstract

The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109020000654
Volume
56
Issue
6
Pages
2237-2271
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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