Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 55 No. 1 2020
Signaling in OTC Markets: Benefits and Costs of Transparency
open access
Abstract
We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex post transparency in over-the-counter markets. Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer’s rents when she disposes of the inventory in a second transaction. We show that costly signaling in a transparent market benefits investors through lower spreads and higher volume. Dealers may also gain from transparency despite lower spreads when potential gains from trade are small or adverse selection is high, because in those circumstances higher volume offsets smaller spreads for dealer profits.
- DOI
- 10.1017/s0022109018001394
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 47-75
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref