Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 59 No. 8 2024

CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

Ahmed Elnahas^1,2; Lei Gao^1,2; Md Noman Hossain^1,2; Jeong‐Bon Kim^1,2

¹ City University of Hong Kong · ² The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Abstract

This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.

DOI

10.1017/s0022109023001023

Volume

59

Issue

8

Pages

3671-3707

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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