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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 39 No. 4 2004

Risk Premia and Preemption in R&D Ventures

Lorenzo Garlappi

Abstract

I analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closed form for the case of a two-stage race in continuous time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead. Compared to the case where firms collude, R&D competition erodes the option value to mothball a project, reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D, and causes higher and more volatile risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109000003239
Volume
39
Issue
4
Pages
843-872
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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