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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 39 No. 1 2004

Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers

Martin Holmén1; John D. Knopf2

1 Uppsala University · 2 Seton Hall University

Abstract

Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109000003938
Volume
39
Issue
1
Pages
167-191
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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