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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 60 No. 5 2025

Nepotism in IPOs: Consequences for Issuers and Investors

François Degeorge1; Giuseppe Pratobevera2

1 Università della Svizzera italiana and Swiss Finance Institute · 2 University of Bristol Business School

open access

Abstract

IPO underwriters have an incentive to underprice an IPO when they allocate shares to their affiliated funds. We label this conflict of interest “supernepotism” and we analyze its effect on IPO pricing. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) on a novel hand-collected data set, we find that higher allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds cause higher IPO underpricing. Our evidence suggests that supernepotism has monetary costs for issuers.

DOI
10.1017/s002210902400053x
Volume
60
Issue
5
Pages
2367-2397
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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