Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 57 No. 8 2022
Agency Costs of Debt in Conglomerate Firms
open access
Abstract
I use an accounting reform to assess the agency cost of debt in diversified firms. Those firms that switch from single to multiple segments following the reform suffer a 12% increase in their bond spread when compared with their stand-alone peers. Consistent with lenders anticipating underinvestment and asset-substitution incentives, diversified firms with high cash-flow volatility across divisions suffer the highest increase in borrowing costs. I employ a novel approach that allows abstracting from unobservable characteristics that would otherwise influence the pricing of diversified firms’ debt.
- DOI
- 10.1017/s0022109021000661
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 3048-3080
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib