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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 56 No. 6 2021

Neglecting Peter to Fix Paul: How Shared Directors Transmit Bank Shocks to Nonfinancial Firms

Leonid Pugachev1; Andrea Schertler2

1 Rochester Institute of Technology · 2 Institute of Finance and Banking

Abstract

We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109020000587
Volume
56
Issue
6
Pages
2170-2207
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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