Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 53 No. 3 2018
The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
Abstract
We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.
- DOI
- 10.1017/s0022109017001065
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1297-1339
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref