Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 55 No. 6 2020
CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts
Abstract
We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.
- DOI
- 10.1017/s0022109019000632
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1757-1791
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref